Recent South African history has already proven that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s decision to send the army into crime-infested communities will fail miserably.
Deploying the army may gain Ramaphosa the applause of populist and performative politicians such as the EFF’s Julius Malema and others, but it will not improve the crime situation in those communities an iota.
Instead, Ramaphosa’s decision is very likely to pour fuel on the raging fire that is crime in these townships.
Politically, it is also a risky move. Ramaphosa is sending an army whose chiefs have, over the past year, acted and spoken in defiance of his express orders.
Why would you send an ill-disciplined, motor-mouthed, leadership cohort like this into communities and expect them to perform well at an endeavour in which they are not trained or prepared?
The first human being Ramaphosa should have considered before deploying the army was a man called Collins Khosa.
On April 10 2020, during the first Covid-19 lockdown period in SA, soldiers patrolling in Alexandra township allegedly saw a cup with alcohol in it in Khosa’s yard.
Alcohol sales and consumption in public were banned. Khosa was in his own yard.
When they spotted the cup (how did they know there was alcohol in it?) they ordered Khosa out of his house, poured beer over him, choked him, slammed him against a cement wall and steel gate, and hit him with the butt of a machine gun.
He died later that evening from his injuries.
An internal SANDF board of inquiry initially cleared the soldiers of liability.
Khosa’s case is just one example that illustrates that soldiers should not be deployed in communities without proper forethought.
Combat vs law enforcement
They are not trained for law enforcement. They are not trained for investigation.
They should be on the borders, protecting SA’s sovereignty.
Ramaphosa should have taken the time to revisit the year 2019 as well as when he took the decision to deploy the SANDF to townships.
In July that year, the government deployed 1,300 soldiers in the Western Cape in a campaign named Operation Prosper.
They were deployed in 10 areas in the Cape Flats at a cost of R23.3m.
At the time of the deployment, the then South African army chief, Lindile Yam, told a media conference that crime-fighting was the role of the South African Police Service and “we wouldn’t like necessarily to be involved in this environment. It’s not what we’re trained for”.
Instead of calling in the army, the government should clean up (as the ongoing Madlanga commission shows we should) the SAPS, strengthen police operations at crime intelligence and other levels, improve prosecutorial performance. Fix the criminal justice system. Root out corruption.
Yam was right. Not a single crime analyst since then has pointed to any successes from Operation Prosper.
Indeed, we are here now — with far worse crime and gang violence — because no structural change was implemented in 2019.
We hid the wound under fancy swabs of white bandage but did not treat it.
Instead of calling in the army, the government should clean up (as the ongoing Madlanga commission shows we should) the SAPS, strengthen police operations at crime intelligence and other levels, improve prosecutorial performance. Fix the criminal justice system. Root out corruption.
Calling in the military satisfies those who like posturing, but photo opportunities will not sort out the capacity problems in the SAPS.
That takes serious and focused leadership.
Ramaphosa’s decision to deploy the army says something else on the leadership issue.
It says there are no consequences for poor performance at leadership level in the SAPS or in SA in general.
The police have failed to fix the gang and crime problem in the Western Cape and in Gauteng.
If there was consequence management in SA, then police commissioner Fannie Masemola should have been fired by now.
Masemola has failed. Instead of firing him, Ramaphosa brings in the army.
What is Masemola’s job? What is the police minister’s job?
Then there’s the political problem. Over the past year, it has become clear that some defence force leaders are flirting with intervention in the political system.
In August 2025, SANDF chief Rudzani Maphwanya met top Iranian military officials, reportedly pledged solidarity with Iran, and called for deeper military co-operation between SA and Iran.
It’s not his place to make such political statements.
Last month, SA Navy chiefs apparently defied Ramaphosa’s explicit instruction that Iran should not participate in a naval exercise off the SA coast and that the country should instead be relegated to observer status.
Ramaphosa has still not even got an answer to why his naval chiefs defied him.
Now they are being sent to get comfortable in communities.
As we know from the 1980s and from elsewhere in the world, the army is not right for this.
It is not trained for this. And it will fail at this as it has done before.
The main causes of crime in SA are lack of consequences for wrongdoing, endemic poverty, stubborn unemployment, lack of decent housing and other social issues in these communities.
Deal with these. Add a strong, well-resourced and effective police service and you will deal with crime effectively.
