In the maritime tradition, there is a saying, “The captain goes down with the ship,” suggesting that in the event of an emergency at sea, it is the captain who bears the ultimate burden to save the ship and those on board, or to die trying.
This metaphor is used here to offer a balanced assessment of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s reformist ambitions and political shortcomings during his tenure.
Ramaphosa was elected into office in 2017, in what many characterised as a significant moment in SA’s political history.
Just a year before his presidency, state capture became the focal point of engagement in SA’s political arena.
During this period, public trust in the ANC government was severely declining, with negative consequences for the country’s economic, social, and political institutions.
Likewise, at this time, the ANC finds itself deeply embroiled in factional battles, which have sent signals of decline, as it has fragmented the tripartite alliance, leading to the loss of some major metropolitan municipalities across the country.
While some spectators position Ramaphosa as a president who inherited an organisation damaged and bleeding from his predecessors, and attempted to fix some institutional damage, one cannot ignore that his presidency coincided with political fragmentation, governance failure, and the accelerated electoral decline within the ANC.
At the initial phase of his presidency, Ramaphosa entered office wearing a mantle as a “renewal figure”, promising to restore credibility in the state and the party.
The promise was the “New Dawn”, which he coined in 2018, suggesting an era of the rule of law, institutional renewal, and transparency, as many observers believed.
The country was in a moment of euphoria as many viewed him as an anti-corruption and ethical figure, a darling of international spectators and the business community who anchored hopes for economic recovery and the restoration of the National Prosecuting Authority, SA Revenue Service, and parts of the judiciary.
International investor confidence improved initially, and some argue that under his leadership, sections of the state became stable after what appeared to be a decade of institutional erosion.
Despite the prevailing view among many South Africans that he is a corrective figure, expectations may have exceeded the ANC’s actual institutional capacity to reform itself.
Turning to state capture and the limitations of the ANC’s internal renewal, it appears the greatest contradiction in Ramaphosa’s leadership was the attempt to reform the party through the same internal networks implicated in its decline.
Indeed, the Zondo commission revelations were damaging to the ANC when deep entanglement in corruption was exposed.
Across the country, commentators and opposition political parties spoke out on the slow pace of accountability within the party.
The “step-aside” rule — an internal policy that required members charged with corruption to recuse themselves from party and government responsibilities voluntarily has created tensions within the ANC.
Claims that this instrument has been weaponised for political agendas have often been the response of those found to have violated it.
Failure to decisively root out and isolate corruption networks weakened his reform credibility.
While his proponents have argued that he lacked sufficient internal support to move aggressively, this is often attributed to his calculated timing.
The ANC, under his term, increasingly appeared divided internally, morally compromised, and incapable of self-correction.
His tenure has been characterised by persistent unemployment, slow economic growth, the Eskom crisis, the rise in the cost of living, and the challenge of reducing inequality and poverty.
While some crises were inherent and global in nature, voters in SA increasingly judge governments by the outcomes of the promises made by the leadership, rather than by inherited conditions.
In the final analysis, the ANC’s liberation legitimacy weakened as socio-economic frustration intensified.
A more recent controversy is the Phala Phala scandal, which appears to have damaged the anti-corruption reformer, Ramaphosa.
Despite his claims of innocence, the argument against the event on his farm led to inconsistent public perceptions of secrecy.
It further blurred the distinction between him and his predecessors’ controversies.
No criminal conviction has yet emerged from the scandal.
Nevertheless, politically, perception is enough capital to outweigh legal outcome, especially in the atmosphere of an election.
Therefore, these events have made it difficult for the ANC to present itself as an organisation still rooted in the normative virtues upon which it was founded.
There is enough evidence to suggest Ramaphosa will not save the ANC but is instead presiding over a sinking ship or leading the party towards that direction.
Under his leadership, the party suffered its most significant electoral setback since 1994.
In many municipalities, the ANC either failed to secure a majority or reclaim the ones lost in 2016.
Despite some debate in the academic space, which suggests a coalition government was inevitable, there is no doubt Ramaphosa’s term sped up this transition.
Furthermore, the ANC suffered a major blow when it lost its electoral hegemony and saw the rise of the MKP, led by its former president Jacob Zuma.
While it’s fair to point out that Ramaphosa did not create some of the conditions used to judge him, it was during his presidency that the ANC’s electoral decline became undeniable.
It is important to note that the ANC crisis extends beyond an individual. It reflects a long chain of patronage politics, structural governance challenges, and the erosion of the liberation movement’s moral legitimacy in a democratic SA.
Siyanda Kate, iYunivesithi Walter Sisulu: political sciences lecturer and Nelson Mandela University: Political studies PhD candidate
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