Gulf conflict exposes vulnerabilities in SA’s food systems

Much of the global attention on tensions involving the US, Israel and Iran has focused on oil markets and the Strait of Hormuz.

While recent diplomatic efforts have eased some immediate fears of prolonged disruption, the crisis has exposed a deeper and less visible vulnerability: the dependence of food systems on fragile global supply chains.

For SA, the lesson is clear. Even temporary instability in the Middle East can reverberate through fertiliser markets, agricultural exports, transport costs and household food security.

SA’s agricultural sector is highly dependent on fertiliser imports, making it deeply exposed to global supply disruptions.

In 2023 alone, fertiliser imports were valued at $824m (R13.63bn) after a peak of more than $1.5bn (R24.82bn) in 2022, underscoring the scale of reliance on external markets.

Nitrogen-based fertilisers dominate these imports, accounting for more than half of total import value and nearly two-thirds of volume.

The country’s fertiliser supply is highly concentrated among a handful of global partners: Saudi Arabia and Russia dominate imports, alongside Qatar and China, with these four sources accounting for the bulk of supply.

More specifically, Saudi Arabia contributes about 19% of total fertiliser import value, while Russia is the second-largest supplier, and together with Qatar and China these countries account for more than 57% of SA’s fertiliser imports.

Crucially, many of these suppliers are reliant on transportation routes linked to the Middle East.

This means that any disruption tied to an Iran, US, and Israel escalation, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, does not just threaten oil flows, but a supply chain that underpins more than half of SA’s fertiliser inputs.

In addition, the recent threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz not only constrain SA’s access to inputs; they also disrupt its ability to export, particularly through key regional nodes such as the Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai, one of the primary entry points for South African fresh produce into the Gulf.

The Middle East represents a critical market valued at about $1.3bn for South African fruit exporters, and with about 90% of this produce transported by sea, any disruption to maritime routes through the Strait immediately threatens the viability of these trade flows.

Delays, rerouting and port congestion not only raise costs but also compromise the quality of highly perishable goods, eroding SA’s competitiveness in these markets.

The consequences extend far beyond trade balances.

When export channels narrow, farm revenues contract, seasonal labour demand declines and agro-processing value chains begin to shed jobs — effects that ripple disproportionately through rural economies.

This is especially significant in a sector such as fresh fruit, which accounts for 28% of total agricultural employment and supports more than 400,000 jobs across the wider value chain through multiplier effects.

With more than 90% of SA’s fruit production destined for export markets, disruptions to trade routes do not just affect firms; they threaten an entire employment ecosystem that stretches from farms to packhouses, logistics and ports.

Fuel costs are a critical transmission channel through which distant conflicts reshape local food access.

While local and informal food markets significantly reduce travel distances, often within a few kilometres, the dominant commercial food system is typically more transport-intensive.

Locally sourced fresh produce in African cities can travel as little as 11km from farm to fork, highlighting the efficiency of localised foodsheds.

In contrast, more formalised and centralised supply chains depend on longer distribution networks, making them more vulnerable to fuel price shocks.

As fuel prices rise due to instability in global oil transit routes, transport costs increase across the food system, ultimately raising consumer prices.

As costs climb from the farm to the warehouse and finally to the shelf, the highest price is ultimately paid by the most vulnerable families at the checkout counter.

Beyond transport, energy itself is a critical component of food access, particularly for cooking.

In 2024, about 7.2% of South African households relied on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), while 2.2% depended on paraffin, with usage especially concentrated in peri-urban and informal settlements.

As global fuel markets tighten, the cost of these essential energy sources rises, forcing vulnerable households to make difficult trade-offs — often between purchasing food and preparing it.

In this way, the ripple effects of a geopolitical crisis extend beyond availability and price, cutting into the ability of households to convert food into nourishment.

The immediate crisis may eventually pass through diplomacy, but the vulnerabilities it has exposed will remain.

SA cannot assume that future geopolitical shocks will be resolved before they affect food prices, agricultural inputs, or export markets.

Building resilient food systems is therefore not simply an agricultural challenge; it is a national security imperative.

• Dr Mandlenkosi Maphosa is a Research Fellow at the Fort Hare Institute for Economic and Social Research, where his research focuses on climate resilience, food systems, rural livelihoods and urban governance. He holds a PhD from Rhodes University.